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1. Introduction 
Human trafficking is an emerging problem that is rapid-
ly growing today (Interpol, 2009). Income disparity be-
tween the affluent North and (relatively) impoverished 
South is still considerable, if not increasing, and peo-
ple’s aspirations to seek better opportunities have be-
come greater, as information on life in other parts of 
the world is now more readily available than ever be-
fore due to the development of mass media news out-
lets and the internet. Economic motivation explains the 
phenomenon of human trafficking to a great extent, 
given that most victims of human trafficking are initial-
ly migrants with economic reasons (International Or-
ganization for Migration [IOM], 2012). 
However, as far as the causes of human trafficking 
are concerned, an important question is still to be an-
swered. Why do some people attempting to migrate 
elsewhere fall victim to human trafficking, while others 
do not? Furthermore, why is this phenomenon increas-
ing? To the present, the outcome of investigations on 
these questions is inconclusive and there is little consen-
sus on the prime factors determining human trafficking 
in the literature. Among many factors suggested in the 
literature, some factors are important determinants of 
human trafficking in some studies, while in others they 
do not have a significant impact and other factors are 
suggested as crucial causes, instead. Such discrepancy is 
mainly caused by several critical challenges that human 
trafficking researchers are currently facing.  
First, as research on human trafficking is still in its 
infancy, there is no exemplary model identifying the 
determinants of human trafficking. Thus, the choice of 
variables for estimation tends to depend on heuristic 
approaches rather than systematic ones. Given this 
background, the results of empirical investigations on 
human trafficking are more likely to be susceptible to 
the choice of variables. Moreover, difficulties in identi-
fying robust factors are exacerbated due to the poor 
quality of human trafficking data because human traf-
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ficking is a clandestine, criminal activity of a complex 
nature, and therefore current discussions heavily de-
pend on fragmented information that is available.  
In this paper, I try to overcome the incompleteness 
of research on human trafficking and propose a base-
line model by reviewing a comprehensive list of the lit-
erature and empirically assessing the robustness of all 
human trafficking factors suggested in the literature. 
My investigation aims to identify robust factors, while 
controlling for many other overlapping factors. To do 
so, I employ an extreme bound analysis (EBA) that 
identifies factors robust to the choice of other control 
variables. By using this method, we can single out vari-
ables which survive in some million regressions, with 
all possible combinations of other control variables 
(Leamer, 1983; Levine & Renelt, 1992; Sala-i-Martin, 
1997). This method is particularly sensible if there is no 
consensus on the choice of explanatory variables in the 
literature, which is the case of human trafficking re-
search (another exemplary study using the EBA in this 
respect is Hegre and Sambanis’ (2006) sensitivity analy-
sis on the determinants of civil wars). Moreover, in order 
to reduce potential estimation biases caused by meas-
urement errors and selection biases in human trafficking 
data, I make a use of the three different global meas-
urements on human trafficking in-/outflows—United 
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) (2006), 
United States Department of State (2011–2014), and In-
ternational Labor Organization (ILO) (2005)—, and com-
pare the results of the these measurements.  
From the literature consisting of 19 major empirical 
studies systematically analyzing the causes of human 
trafficking, I gather 70 factors pushing victims to be 
trafficked from origin countries, and 63 factors pulling 
victims trafficked into destination countries. The fac-
tors reflect diverse aspects of human trafficking, but 
can be categorized into four pillars—migration, crime, 
vulnerability, and policy and institutional efforts. The 
four prime pillars explain: (1) which groups of people 
take risky migration options and therefore likely fall 
victim to human trafficking (migration and vulnerability 
pillars); (2) and how/under which environments those 
vulnerable migrants are more easily trafficked (crime 
and policy/institutional efforts pillars). 
My empirical analysis revisits and assesses the rele-
vance of the four pillars on human trafficking. First, my 
findings suggest that the crime pillar of human traffick-
ing is a robust factor pushing and pulling victims in 
origin and destination countries, respectively. Second, 
several factors facilitating migration closely explain 
human trafficking: income and globalization—in par-
ticular, exposure to information. Third, the institutional 
quality pillar matters in origin countries, while the fac-
tors of this pillar do not turn out to have a significant 
impact in destination countries. Last, empirical assess-
ments on the vulnerability pillar indicate controversial 
findings. Interestingly, gender discrimination and low 
development—indicators of the vulnerability of people 
to human trafficking—do not demonstrate robust ef-
fects, and some gender-related indicators such as high 
fertility rates have constraining effects that are contra-
ry to expectations. It seems that gender discrimination 
does not have a straightforward relation with human 
trafficking. In other words, a very low level of gender 
equality also constrains human trafficking, possibly by 
discouraging female mobility.  
My findings provide a baseline set of robust push 
and pull factors based on empirical investigation on the 
four pillars of human trafficking. By doing so, this paper 
suggests a reference for further studies closely looking 
into the specific circumstances of human trafficking, 
and offers policy relevance in terms of suggesting in 
which areas we should focus on in order to combat the 
problem. 
2. Four Pillars of Human Trafficking  
The literature puts forward a large set of push and pull 
factors of human trafficking, the first determining the 
supply of victims from countries of origin, and the latter 
determining demand for labor provided by victims in 
destination countries. The following four pillars provide 
a basic framework to explain the different factors of 
human trafficking in origin and destination countries. 
Each pillar is, of course, not exclusive and many push 
and pull factors can be included in more than one pillar. 
2.1. Migration 
IOM Counter Trafficking Module (CTM), a survey of 
about 25,000 victims, shows that most trafficking vic-
tims were initially recruited for migration through per-
sonal connections or professional agencies, while less 
than 5% in the sample of the survey were kidnapped. 
This observation indicates that, from the outset, the 
majority of trafficking victims voluntarily decide to mi-
grate elsewhere. The literature also supports a linkage 
between migration and human trafficking. Mahmoud 
and Trebesch (2010) suggest that having a migrant in a 
family tends to motivate other family members to mi-
grate and also increases the probability of being traf-
ficked. Akee, Basu, Chau and Khamis (2010) and Akee, 
Bedi, Basu and Chau (2014) also show that migration 
between two countries induces human trafficking flows 
between them. 
With this in mind, various factors promoting migra-
tion can likely explain human trafficking. Among them, 
income is a crucial factor suggested in the literature, giv-
en that migrants commonly come from lower-income 
countries to wealthier countries. The economic motiva-
tion of migrants is shared by victims of human trafficking 
who initially wanted to migrate for economic better-
ment (IOM, 2012). In relation to that, employment op-
portunities for the low-skilled in origin countries and 
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demand for cheap labor in destinations—particularly in 
prostitution, agricultural and informal industries where 
(potential) victims of human trafficking are typically em-
ployed—can shape certain migration patterns more 
prone to human trafficking. Additionally, factors facilitat-
ing migration and human mobility across borders—such 
as globalization and migration policy—can also provide a 
linkage to human trafficking flows.  
2.2. Vulnerability 
Above, I addressed the linkage between migration and 
human trafficking because most trafficking victims are 
initially migration seekers. Thus, it is reasonable to ex-
pect that migration factors can provide at least rudi-
mentary indicators of human trafficking; therefore, de-
terminants of migration are overlapped with push and 
pull factors of human trafficking to some extent. How-
ever, the pool of migrants is not identical to that of 
trafficking victims, and thus one needs to raise a fur-
ther question in explaining human trafficking: why do 
some migrants fall victim to human trafficking, while 
others do not? In other words, what makes some mi-
grants more vulnerable to human trafficking? In tack-
ling this question, a vulnerability assessment is note-
worthy (Akee, Basu, Chau, & Khamis, 2012). 
The literature widely points out that the vulnerable 
position of women in society is a powerful push factor of 
human trafficking outflows (Bettio & Nandi, 2010; Claw-
son & Layne, 2007; Danailova-Trainor & Belser, 2006; Di 
Tommaso, Shima, Strøm, & Bettio, 2009). Human traf-
ficking is apparently gender-based violence, the majority 
of victims being females exploited in the sex industry 
(UNODC, 2006; IOM, 2012). Among many types of gen-
der discrimination, women’s vulnerable position in em-
ployment likely pushes them to take risky migration op-
tions which may turn into human trafficking.  
There are also other factors making people more 
vulnerable to human trafficking. As discussed above, 
income is both a push and pull factor of human traffick-
ing. However, it might be perceived that income differ-
ences actually motivate people to undertake risky mi-
gration because such a difference can make people 
resentful towards their current situation, and raise ex-
pectations for a better life. In this regard, income ine-
quality can be a strong factor pushing underprivileged 
people to be trafficked (Jac-Kucharski, 2012; Mo, 
2011). Also, conflicts, human rights violations, and so-
cioeconomic/political unrest lead people into desper-
ately wanting to escape from their current living situa-
tion, therefore making people under such 
circumstances more vulnerable to human trafficking 
(Akee et al., 2010; Frank, 2011).  
2.3. Crime 
While human trafficking is associated with certain pat-
terns of migration, it is, at the same time, a crime in-
volving the illegal transportation of people and exploi-
tation of them (UN, 2000). In fact, human trafficking 
occurs only if there are perpetrators exploiting vulner-
able migrants. According to Interpol (2009), human 
trafficking is the third largest transnational crime, 
bringing large profits for organized criminal groups. 
Much of the criminology literature documents the 
connection between human smuggling, human traffick-
ing, and organized crime activities (Aronowitz, 2001). 
The studies show that organized criminal organiza-
tions—which are already involved in human smuggling 
and drug/arms trafficking—are now expanding their 
business into trading victims of human trafficking for 
exploitative labor. These studies point out that such in-
volvement of criminal organizations enlarges the scope 
of human trafficking operation, with profits made 
through such business amounting to billions of dollars 
every year (Belser, 2005). In quantitative empirical 
studies, Akee et al. (2014) pioneered a study on traf-
fickers’ incentives to operate human trafficking busi-
ness in different countries. Their study suggests that 
the level of law enforcement and corruption, as well as 
prostitution policy, can affect traffickers’ incentives in 
selecting countries for their criminal operations.  
Based on the discussions in the literature, the prev-
alence of human trafficking can be determined by prof-
itability, which is related to market sizes and conditions 
in which trafficking victims are typically employed (e.g., 
prostitution, domestic servitude, agriculture and other 
informal sectors), the risk of being caught (law en-
forcement level), and the presence of already estab-
lished criminal organizations with respect to operating 
costs and experience in trafficking businesses. Indeed, 
the crime aspect of human trafficking is something that 
has widely been neglected in the empirical literature, 
and thus linkages between human trafficking and the 
prevalence of crime are still empirically inconclusive.  
2.4. Policy and Institutional Efforts 
As human trafficking is a crime, institutional efforts in 
combating the crime play an important role. Human 
trafficking researchers discuss law enforcement and the 
level of corruption as important factors, both in origin 
and destination countries (Akee et al. 2010, 2014; Cho, 
Dreher, & Neumayer, 2013; 2014; Jakobsson & Kotsa-
dam, 2013). Besides the general rule of law, specific anti-
trafficking measures are also crucial to addressing the 
problem (Cho et al. 2014; Cho & Vadlamannati, 2012; 
Potrafke, 2013). The anti-trafficking measures include 
prosecution policy against traffickers, protection policy 
for victims, and prevention policy (UN, 2000). These 
measures are essential as human trafficking is a specif-
ic form of crime which cannot be fully addressed by 
other existing laws.  
Furthermore, general developmental policies are 
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also important because the root causes of human traf-
ficking are closely related to developmental problems 
such as poverty, inequality and gender discrimination 
bringing about risks for human security.  
3. Data: Measuring Human Trafficking  
One of the challenges of investigating human traffick-
ing is the lack of reliable data (Kangaspunta, 2003). As 
human trafficking is a clandestine, illicit criminal activi-
ty, the true magnitude of the problem is still unknown. 
Furthermore, despite the international definition of 
human trafficking adopted by the United Nations (UN)’ 
Anti-trafficking Protocol (2000), it is hard to clearly dis-
tinguish this phenomenon from illegal migration and 
forced labor in practice, with many countries using dif-
ferent variations of the definition (for instance, includ-
ing sex trafficking only, or applying the ‘forced labor’ 
concept). In fact, at present, there is no internationally 
comparable official statistics capturing the magnitude 
of human trafficking (van Dijk, 2008). The United Na-
tions Surveys on Crime Trends and the Operations of 
Criminal Justice Systems (UNCTS) provide police statis-
tics on the reported number of human trafficking cases 
for the period of 2005–2008, covering a maximum of 
80 countries.1 However, these statistics hardly reflect 
the true extent of the problem, with variations in sta-
tistics across countries and time instead capturing the 
level of law enforcement and differences in the defini-
tion of human trafficking between countries (Harren-
dorf, Heiskanen, & Malby, 2010).  
Despite the problems of human trafficking data col-
lection mentioned above, there are several interna-
tional attempts to quantify the level of human traffick-
ing by utilizing various sources, including media 
reports, expert judgments, and qualitative information 
from fieldwork. Among them, three datasets provide 
quantitative information on the magnitude of human 
trafficking which is comparable across countries. First, 
the United Nations Office on Drug and Crime (UNODC, 
2006) proposes an incidence reporting index, grading 
the level of human trafficking in/outflows on a scale of 
0 to 5 based on incidences coded in international re-
ports and media. This index covers up to 161 countries 
and aggregates numbers over the period of 1996–
2003. Second, the United States Department of State 
(2001–2014) categorizes countries into major destina-
tions/origins based on the classification of whether a 
country experiences more than 100 reported cases of 
in/outflows in a given year. The US annual data is a 
dummy variable covering up to 190 countries from 
2001 to 2013. Third, the International Labor Organiza-
tion collected information on incidences through its 
                                                          
1 Additionally, there are EU-wide statistics on human trafficking 
collected and published by the European Commission (2013), 
covering 34 member states from 2008 to 2010.  
global reporting system and provides the aggregate 
number of cases during the period of 1995–2000, cov-
ering a maximum of 74 countries.2 
These selected datasets have several advantages. 
First, they are gathered by a single collection body un-
der a unified definition of human trafficking, minimiz-
ing noises caused by disparities in collection methods 
and definitions. Second, as they are not police statis-
tics, these datasets are comparatively less susceptible 
to biases caused by law enforcement efforts. However, 
these data have some shortcomings as well. First, they 
are still subject to biases in data collection because 
they depend on reported incidences. Second, the 
UNODC and ILO data provide aggregate quantities 
without variations over time, while the panel data pro-
vided by the US Department of State is a dummy varia-
ble with few variations. With the constraints of the 
available data in mind, I employ each of the three da-
tasets in my analysis and compare the results in order 
to reduce any biases and fragmentation each dataset 
has. Furthermore, I include control variables capturing 
as many reporting biases as possible in my estimation 
model. In doing so, the UNODC dataset serves as the 
main measurement and the other two as check for the 
robustness because the UNODC data follows the defini-
tion of human trafficking suggested by the UN Anti-
trafficking Protocol (2000), and thus, the collected in-
formation reflects the internationally accepted scopes 
of human trafficking most precisely. The definitions of 
human trafficking adopted by the ILO and the United 
States are widely similar to that of the UNODC with 
minor variations—ILO not specifying forms of human 
trafficking and the US specifically mentioning commer-
cial sex as a cause of human trafficking. The detailed 
definitions of human trafficking and information on the 
three datasets are provided in Appendix A.  
4. Research Design  
The aim of my study is to select robust push and pull 
factors of human trafficking. In order to pursue this 
goal, I follow two procedures. First, I review all major 
existing literature in the field of human trafficking, in 
particular empirical studies, and collect all factors sug-
gested by these studies. Indeed, empirical studies are 
rare in this field mainly because of the lack of data. 
With the best of my knowledge, I identified and select-
ed 19 studies3—to date—empirically investigating the 
                                                          
2 The IOM CTM provides enriched information on the charac-
teristics of victims; however, this dataset is not suitable for a 
macro-analysis given that it is micro-survey data without a ref-
erence to the magnitude of the problem at the country level.  
3 Akee et al. (2010, 2012, 2014), Bales (2007), Belser (2005), 
Bettio and Nandi (2010), Cho (2013), Cho et al. (2013), Clawson 
and Layne (2007), Danailova-Trainor and Belser (2006), Di 
Tommaso et al. (2009), Frank (2011), Jac-Kucharski (2012), Jak-
obsson and Kotsadam (2013), Mahmoud and Trebesch (2010), 
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determinants of human trafficking by using systematic 
analyses. Through reviewing the currently available 
studies, I identify 70 (potential) push factors in coun-
tries of origin, and 63 (potential) pull factors in coun-
tries of destination. The full list of the push and pull 
factors suggested in these studies, can be found in Ap-
pendices B and C.  
As mentioned earlier, it is a challenging task to dis-
tinguish between robust factors while controlling for 
many other factors with overlapping effects, in particu-
lar because there are no established findings in the 
human trafficking literature. With these challenges in 
mind, I try to identify robust factors of human traffick-
ing by employing an extreme bound analysis. The ex-
treme bounds analysis (EBA), proposed by Leamer 
(1983), Levine and Renelt (1992) and Sala-i-Martin 
(1997), is a method to check the statistical significance 
of the effect of a factor in all possible specifications, 
with different combinations of other factors.  
The main advantage of this method is that it distin-
guishes factors robust to the choice of other control 
variables, and therefore enables to identify ‘true’ vari-
ables (Sala-i-Martin, 1997), which explain human traf-
ficking. However, the EBA approach may still be unable 
to identify a full set of robust explanatory variables if 
most factors suggested in the literature are not corre-
lated systematically with human trafficking at all. Such 
a potential problem may not be trivial in the literature 
of human trafficking because this is a new field with a 
thin volume of literature and furthermore the poor 
quality of data on human trafficking makes empirical 
research difficult. Acknowledging the limitation, I fur-
ther check the credibility of the suggested factors with 
qualitative studies on human trafficking. Among them, 
Cameron and Newman (2008) list 32 structural and 
proximate factors of human trafficking based on nu-
merous field reports of international organizations and 
expert opinions. The majority of the factors suggested 
in their study overlaps with the push and pull factors 
documented from the empirical studies I gathered. 
Moreover, the UNODC (2008) also addresses nine soci-
oeconomic, political conditions making people vulner-
able to human trafficking, supporting the selection of 
the push and pull factors in the empirical literature. 
Due to this fact, the 70 push and 63 pull factors gath-
ered in this paper likely represent determinants of hu-
man trafficking to at least a considerable degree. 
In performing the EBA analysis I use the three dif-
ferent human trafficking datasets described in Section 
3. In doing so, the UNODC data is used as the main 
measurement and the other two as for a robustness 
check. In the end, the results of the three measure-
ments are compared in order to minimize any bias 
each dataset has—this procedure is described in more 
                                                                                           
Mo (2011), Rao and Presenti (2012), Smith and Smith (2010), 
and Zhang, Finch and Qin (2011).  
detail in Section 5. 
The following equation is estimated for the EBA 
analysis. 
)1(  ZECy ZECi  (1)
 
In this equation y indicates the level of human traf-
ficking in-/outflows, respectively, and vector C includes 
a “commonly accepted” explanatory variable that is 
widely suggested in the literature and therefore always 
included in every regression. In this study, income 
(logged GDP pc) is selected, because most studies ex-
amined here unanimously suggest “income” as both a 
pull and push factor of human trafficking (see Appen-
dices B and C), given that most human trafficking vic-
tims are initially migrants seeking better economic op-
portunities in a more affluent world (see discussions in 
Section 2.1).  
All other variables under investigation, except for 
“income”, enter the vector E one by one, with each 
variable being tested, while controlling for income and 
three other control variables in the vector Z (Levine 
and Renelt, 1992).4 The vector Z contains three control 
variables in each regression and all variables, except for 
‘income’ and the variable currently being examined in 
E, enter into Z. The composition of explanatory varia-
bles in Z changes for each regression, as all possible 
combinations of control variables are being tested. δ 
denotes the coefficient of the respective variables and 
 is the idiosyncratic error term.  
As the UNODC and ILO data do not have time varia-
tions, I conduct a cross-sectional analysis by employing 
an ordered probit estimation method with the UNODC 
data, capturing the ordered structure of the dependent 
variable (score 0–5), and a negative binomial regres-
sion method with the ILO data, addressing the nature 
of the count variable. On the other hand, the US data 
contains annual variations (2000–2010), therefore I 
perform a panel analysis with a probit estimation 
method as follows.5  
)2(  ZECy ZECit  (2)
 
Finally, I report each median coefficient and its 
standard error, the percentage of the regressions (i.e., 
                                                          
4 For the UNODC and ILO datasets that are cross-sectional, I 
average the values of the explanatory variables for the periods 
of 1996–2003 and 1995–2000, respectively. For the US data 
with time variations, I first take the contemporary values of the 
explanatory variables, and one-year lagged values as for ro-
bustness check. The results are qualitatively identical.  
5 In this panel analysis, the lagged dependent variable is not in-
cluded as an explanatory variable because the inclusion of the 
lagged value will absorb much of variations and therefore may 
undermine the explanatory power of the variables, given the 
binary structure of the dependent variable.  
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% sign) in which the coefficient of the variable is statis-
tically different from zero at the 5% level, as well as the 
proportion of the coefficient’s cumulative distribution 
function that is greater or less than 0 (i.e., CDF(0)). 
Leamer (1983) originally proposed to deem a variable 
as “robust” if both the lower and upper extreme 
bounds6 for the coefficient of the variable in E have the 
same sign. However, Sala-i-Martin (1997) argues that 
this criterion is too strict, insofar that most variables 
would not survive such extreme bound tests. Instead, 
he recommends a procedure analyzing the entire dis-
tribution of the coefficient (for more detailed discus-
sions on this method, see Sala-i-Martin (1997)). Follow-
ing Sala-i-Martin, I take a CDF(0) value of 0.90—
significance at the 10% level—as the threshold for a 
variable to be considered as “robust”.  
To identify push factors in countries of origin, I ran 
543,150 regressions, while 406,159 regressions are run 
to estimate pull factors in countries of destination. Fol-
lowing these steps, I then compare the robustness of 
push and pull factors in each of the three estimation 
models using the UNODC, ILO and US data, respective-
ly. Finally, I test for the robustness of the findings 
through two different approaches. First, I re-run the 
regressions excluding Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) members in order 
to find out whether the main results are solely driven 
by developed countries. Second, I apply a regional 
jackknife method, omitting one continent in each re-
gression, checking whether one specific continent 
drives all the results. In total, I test seven sub-group 
samples by running more than one million regressions 
additionally. The results show that the main findings—
which are presented in Section 5 below—are neither 
driven by any specific continent, nor the developed 
world alone.7  
5. Results  
5.1. Push Factors 
In order to identify push factors of human trafficking in 
countries of origin, I test for the robustness of each of 
the 70 variables suggested in the literature. Through 
the first step of employing the UNODC data as the de-
pendent variable, 35 variables are identified as “robust”, 
with a CDF(0) value of 0.90 or higher—significance at 
                                                          
6 The lower extreme bound is defined as the lowest value for 
the coefficient minus two standard deviations, and the upper 
extreme bound is defined as the highest value for the coeffi-
cient plus two standard deviations (Sala-i-Martin, 1997). 
7 The regression results of sub-group testing are not presented 
in this paper due to the limitation of space, but can be ob-
tained by the author upon request.  
the 10% level. In the second step of checking for ro-
bustness by using the ILO and US data, only six of the 
35 variables are confirmed to be robust in all of the es-
timation models. Additionally, seven variables turn out 
to be robust in two out of the three models. This analy-
sis covers up to 151 countries for the period of 1996–
2003 (UNODC data, 151 countries), 1995–2000 (ILO da-
ta, 63 countries), and 2000–2010 (US data, 140 coun-
tries). Table 1 shows the results regarding these robust 
variables. Statistics provided in the table are based on 
results by ordered probit regressions using the UNODC 
data. In addition, marginal effects are estimated by OLS 
methods for the simplicity of interpretation. 
The most robust push factors, which turn out to be 
significant in all of the three models are: (log) GDP per 
capita (negative); the share of the food, beverage, and 
tobacco industries in GDP (negative); fertility rates 
(negative); information flows (positive)—i.e., percent-
age of internet users, TV, and trade in newspapers; a 
dummy representing a transitional economy (positive); 
and percentage of Muslims in the total population 
(negative).  
In line with the migration literature, poorer coun-
tries tend to send more human trafficking victims. The 
significant impact of income implies the migratory mo-
tivation of victims for economic reasons. Quantitative-
ly, the marginal effects that are calculated by OLS esti-
mation show that an increase in GDP pc by 10%-points 
reduces human trafficking outflows by 2% (i.e., 0.12 
points on the 0–5 scale). The result also shows that an 
increase in information flows by 10 points (on the 0–
100 scale) increases in human trafficking outflows by 
3%. The positive impact of information flows8 indicates 
that more exposure to outside information tends to 
encourage people to migrate and therefore increases 
the pool of potential victims of human trafficking. 9 
The share of the food, beverage, and tobacco in-
dustries in GDP has a constraining effect on human 
trafficking outflows. This variable is associated with 
demand for low skill labor in a country; having a large 
industry in this field is likely to create more jobs for 
people who may have taken dubious migration oppor-
tunities, otherwise. 
                                                          
8 On the contrary, Mahmoud and Trebesch (2010) and Mo 
(2011) find a constraining impact of TV and phone usage on 
human trafficking outflows in five Eastern European countries 
and Nepal, respectively.  
9 On the other hand, migration outflows, proxied with net migra-
tion and emigration rates of the tertiary educated, do not turn 
out to be significant. Noting that the two available indicators of 
migration outflows used here may not correctly reflect total mi-
gration outflows, a linkage between migration and human traf-
ficking outflows needs to be further investigated by using more 
precise measurements once they become available. 
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Table 1. Robust push factors. 
Estimation Method Ordered Probit OLS 
Variable Average Beta Average  
Std. Error 
% Sign CDF-U Marginal 
Effects 
(log) GDP pc. –2.138 0.379 0.990 0.999 –1.199 
Information flows 0.039 0.014 0.724 0.964 0.023 
Transition economy  1.675 6.029 0.953 0.987 1.571 
Muslim share –0.008 0.003 0.681 0.961 –0.011 
Fertility rate –0.610 0.138 0.979 0.998 –0.045 
Food, beverage and tobacco industries  –0.033 0.011 0.975 0.996 –0.044 
Rule of law –0.381 0.247 0.398 0.916 –0.589 
Control of corruption –0.522 0.238 0.629 0.961 –0.238 
Infant mortality rate –0.016 0.008 0.617 0.922 –0.002 
Share of age group 0-14 in population –0.089 0.023 0.898 0.986 –0.065 
Crime rate 0.042 0.039 0.190 0.901 0.025 
Europe and Central Asia 0.865 6.023 0.760 0.955 0.465 
North Africa and Middle East –1.014 0.418 0.684 0.960 –0.364 
Note: Statistics presented in this table are based on the ordered probit estimation results using the UNODC data. In addition to that, 
the marginal effects were calculated by OLS. The coefficients of the first three variables are significant in all of the three models 
(UNODC, ILO, and US). The coefficients of the latter ten variables are significant in two of the three models (i.e. UNODC and one ad-
ditional model—either ILO or US). The base variable is (log) GDP pc. The threshold to consider a variable robust is 0.9. 
Increasing the share of these industries in GDP by 
10%-points decreases human trafficking outflows by 
7.3% (i.e., 0.44 points on the 0–5 scale).10 Also, similar to 
Akee et al. (2010), being a transitional economy increas-
es human trafficking by 26%. This finding is sensible giv-
en that countries under transition may not provide se-
cure livelihoods for their citizens, and therefore people 
tend to seek migration options outside. This is particular-
ly true for Eastern European countries which have expe-
rienced political and economic crises after the collapse 
of the communist regimes in the late 1980s, while, at 
the same time, having become more exposed to West-
ern Europe—a popular destination of migration and 
human trafficking.  
An interpretation of the negative sign for fertility 
rates is tricky, however. One may surmise that high fer-
tility rates are usually associated with overpopulation 
and underdevelopment, pushing people to pursue risky 
migration options, therefore making it more likely to be 
victims of human trafficking. However, the result shows 
the opposite, indicating that higher fertility rates tend to 
decrease human trafficking in countries of origin (i.e. an 
increase in fertility rates by 10%-points reduces human 
trafficking by 8.3%). One possible interpretation is that 
higher fertility rates are associated with a more con-
servative attitude towards women’s role in society, 
therefore decreasing women’s mobility and aspiration 
for migration. This interpretation is plausible, given that 
many of the major origin countries are not necessarily 
                                                          
10 The data on the share of the food, beverage, and tobacco in-
dustries in GDP includes 112 countries, thus approximately 
25% of the total observations (151 countries) is missing. About 
half of the missing values (19) come from Sub-Saharan African 
countries, while in other regions missing values are less than 
10% of the total observations. Given that, one should interpret 
the result with caution for Africa. 
the most oppressive countries towards women, and the 
level of female education and labor participation is not 
very low in many origin countries—for instance in East-
ern European and several Latin American countries. Al-
so, the negative impact of a high Muslim population 
supports this interpretation. The result implies that fe-
male mobility is discouraged in Islamic countries which 
have presumably more conservative attitudes towards 
women and very low female economic participation 
(Cooray & Potrafke, 2011). Quantitatively, an increase in 
the share of Muslims in population by 10%-points re-
duces human trafficking outflows by almost 1.7%.  
Other factors which are significant in two of the 
three models are: rule of law (negative); control of cor-
ruption (negative); crime rates (positive); infant mortali-
ty rates (negative); the share of age group 0–14 in popu-
lation (negative); being an Eastern European country 
(positive); being a Middle East/North African country 
(negative).  
My results indicate that poor institutions are a push 
factor of human trafficking, while the previous literature 
shows mixed results with respect to the impact of insti-
tution (see Appendix B). Indeed, weak institutions and 
poor governance are detrimental to the well-being of 
people, and therefore push people to take risky migra-
tion options. Quantitatively, an increase in the rule of 
law by one point on the –2.69 to +2.12 scale decreases 
human trafficking outflows by almost 10%, while an in-
crease in the control of corruption by one point on the –
2.22 to +2.62 scale reduces human trafficking by 4%.  
Also, the prevalence of general crimes is positively 
associated with human trafficking, i.e., an increase in 
total crime rates by 10%-points increases human traf-
ficking by almost 4.2%.11 This finding supports the 
                                                          
11 The number of countries covered in the crime rates are 104, 
loosing approximately 30% of the total observations (151 coun-
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crime aspect of human trafficking, which the current 
literature has not empirically shown—except the study 
by Clawson and Layne (2007) on human trafficking 
flows into the United States.  
The results also indicate that socio-economic envi-
ronments also make people more vulnerable to human 
trafficking. As mentioned earlier, income, employment 
opportunities, and the stability of economy affect hu-
man trafficking outflows. However, the relationship be-
tween the vulnerability of people and the prevalence of 
human trafficking outflows is less clear. Women’s educa-
tion and employment (or any other gender-related indi-
cators used) do not have a significant effect in determin-
ing human trafficking outflows, similar to the mixed 
findings in the literature (see Appendix B). On the other 
hand, the percentage of people under 14 decreases hu-
man trafficking outflows, i.e., increasing the proportion 
of people in this age group by 10%-points reduces hu-
man trafficking outflows by 10.8%.12 It is possibly be-
cause having many children restrains women’s migrato-
ry motives, similar to the negative effect of fertility rates 
above. These findings suggest that women’s rights have 
a complex relationship with human trafficking; i.e., gen-
der discrimination does not necessarily increase human 
trafficking outflows, possibly because oppression against 
women also constraints women’s mobility. Additionally, 
infant mortality rates—a basic indicator measuring fun-
damental well-being—turn out to have negative impact 
(similar to the finding of Mahmoud and Trebesch (2010)) 
but the magnitude of the effect is not practically large—
increasing the mortality rates by 10%-points reduces 
human trafficking by 0.3%.  
In addition to this, economic inequality, measured by 
the GINI index, does not turn out to have a significant 
impact, although the literature (Clawson & Layne, 2007; 
Jac-Kucharski, 2012; Mo, 2011) emphasizes inequality as 
an important cause of human trafficking outflows. How-
ever, the CDF(0) lies between 0.85 and 0.88—marginally 
insignificant—and this result may have been driven by 
many missing observations (about the one third of ob-
servations are missing when including the GINI index in 
regressions). Thus, one should be cautious in interpret-
ing this implication, with further investigation needed.  
Lastly, the results also suggest that geographical lo-
cations influence human trafficking outflows. Being an 
Eastern European country, proximate to affluent West-
ern Europe, increases the outward prevalence of hu-
man trafficking by 7.8%, while being in the Middle 
East/North Africa reduces human trafficking by 6%.  
                                                                                           
tries). Most missing values (28 countries) come from Sub-
Saharan African countries and thus it might be possible that the 
result is driven by selection biases in this region. Except Africa, 
the data of other regions are mostly balanced with less than 10% 
of the total observations being lost. 
12 On the other hand, Bales (2007) and Mahmoud and Trebesch 
(2010) find a positive effect of young populations.  
5.2. Pull Factors 
Turning to pull factors determining human trafficking 
flows into destination countries, I test for the robustness 
of 63 potential factors suggested in the literature. This 
analysis covers up to 153 countries for the period of 
1996–2003 (UNODC data, 153 countries), 1995–2000 
(ILO data, 63 countries), and 2000–2010 (US data, 141 
countries). In the first step of testing with the UNODC 
data, 26 variables are identified as “robust” with a 
CDF(0) value of 0.90 or higher—significance at the 10% 
level. In the second step of using the ILO and US data, 
only three factors turn out to be robust in all of the 
models: (log) GDP per capita (positive); language fraction 
(positive); and information flows (negative). Table 2 
shows the results of these robust pull factors. Statistics 
presented in the table are provided by the results of or-
dered probit regressions employing the UNODC data, 
except the marginal effects calculated by OLS. 
Alongside the migration literature, wealthier countries 
receive more human trafficking victims. Increasing income 
by 10%-points increases human trafficking inflows by 
7.8% (i.e. 0.47 points on the 0–5 scale). Interestingly, in-
formation flows have a constraining effect in destination 
countries, opposite to a push effect found in origin coun-
tries. An increase in information flows by 10 points (on 
the 0–100 scale) reduces human trafficking by almost 2%. 
It could be possible that information increases public 
awareness towards human trafficking problems in desti-
nation countries, while exposure to information in origin 
countries has an opposite effect by motivating people to 
move elsewhere. In line with the findings of Akee et al. 
(2010), more linguistically divided countries tend to in-
duce more human trafficking flows, possibly because hav-
ing many minorities in a country may create markets for 
informal, exploitative, and low-paid labor, where victims 
of human trafficking are typically employed. Quantitative-
ly, an increase in language fraction by 0.1 point (on the 0 
to 1 scale) increases human trafficking by 2.3%. 
In addition to the three factors above, 10 variables 
turn out to have significant effects in two of the three 
models; the percentage of the workforce employed in ag-
riculture (positive); refugee inflows (positive); (log) popu-
lation size (positive); international tourist inflows (posi-
tive); crime rates (positive); (log) amount of heroin seized 
(positive)13; OECD membership (positive); being an East 
Asian country (positive); being a land-locked country (nega-
tive); and the share of Catholics in population (negative). 
                                                          
13 The data on crime rates cover 105 countries, losing approxi-
mately 30% of the total observations, due to many missing val-
ues in Sub-Saharan African countries. However, the heroin da-
ta, another crime indicator, covers 145 countries and missing 
values are less than 10% in the African as well as the other re-
gions. The positive impact of both variables indicates that the 
finding of the crime aspect of human trafficking is less likely 
driven by selection biases.  
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Table 2. Robust pull factors. 
Estimation Method Ordered probit OLS 
Variable Average 
Beta 
Average 
Std. Error 
% Sign CDF-U Marginal 
Effects 
(log) GDP pc.  1.147 0.289 0.970 0.999 4.728 
Information flows -0.019 0.011 0.336 0.919 -0.011 
Language fractionalization 1.281 0.436 0.949 0.994 1.378 
% of workforce in agriculture 0.024 0.010 0.772 0.981 0.021 
Refugees 8.763e-07 4.708e-07 0.608 0.941 2.110e-07 
(log) Population 0.334 0.080 0.996 0.999 0.330 
International tourism 3.094e-08 1.200e-08 0.801 0.975 1.664e-08 
Crime rate 0.173 0.61 0.864 0.977 0.037 
(log) Amount of heroin seized 0.001 0.00005 0.792 0.978 0.28 
OECD membership  0.729 0.354 0.519 0.954 0.271 
East Asia and Pacific  0.640 0.362 0.354 0.932 0.177 
Landlocked country -0.421 0.256 0.267 0.926 -0.616 
Share of Catholic in population  -0.007 0.003 0.772 0.979 -0.007 
Note: Statistics presented in this table are based on the ordered probit estimation results using the UNODC data. In addition to that, 
the marginal effects were calculated by OLS. The coefficients of the first three variables are significant in all of the three models 
(UNODC, ILO, and US). The coefficients of the latter ten variables are significant in two of the three models (i.e. UNODC and one ad-
ditional model—either ILO or US). The base variable is (log) GDP pc. The threshold to consider a variable robust is 0.9. 
The results show that the size of the agricultural 
sector, proxied by the percentage of the workforce 
employed in agriculture, turns out to increase human 
trafficking inflows. An increase in the size of the agri-
cultural sector by 10%-points increases in human traf-
ficking inflows by 3.3%. Given that a considerable por-
tion of trafficking victims is exploited in agricultural 
fields in destination countries, this result indicates that 
demand for labor in agriculture determines the level of 
human trafficking inflows. On the other hand, other 
developmental indicators such as gender equality, and 
health and environmental quality measures, do not 
seem to have any significant impact on human traffick-
ing in destination countries. In fact, it is more difficult 
to build a convincing hypothesis regarding relationship 
between gender discrimination and human trafficking 
in destination countries. Cho (2013) points out that, as 
the majority of trafficking victims are foreigners, a high 
level of women’s rights in a destination country is at 
best irrelevant, or even induces more human traffick-
ing flows. The reason for such a controversial argument 
is that victims of trafficking are usually exploited in sex 
industries or domestic labor markets where local wom-
en in destination countries are less willing to work once 
they have a high level of education and opportunities.  
Interestingly, law enforcement and institutional 
quality do not play an important role in determining 
human trafficking flows into destination countries, dif-
ferent from the results of origin countries. From these 
results, one can surmise that anti-trafficking measures 
are still not well-grounded in general law and enforce-
ment and/or anti-trafficking is not necessarily a policy 
priority in many destination countries—even in coun-
tries with a high level of rule and order.  
Turning to the crime aspect, the results strongly 
suggest that the prevalence of crime in general and or-
ganized crime—the latter proxied by the amount of 
heroin seized—affect the prevalence of human traffick-
ing. An increase in total crime rates by 10%-points in-
creases human trafficking inflows by almost 6.2%, 
while an increase in the amount of heroin seized (kg) 
by the same percentage increases human trafficking in-
flows by 0.5%. Distinguished from the literature so far, 
my study empirically shows that the crime aspect of 
human trafficking is evident both in origin and destina-
tion countries. This finding implies that human traffick-
ing is not merely an accompanying phenomenon of 
human movements, but is caused by environments 
where criminal activities are prevailing. 
As human trafficking is mainly a transnational hu-
man transaction between the developing and devel-
oped world, belonging to the developed world (OECD 
membership) increases human trafficking inflows by 
4.5%. Similar to origin countries, geography and culture 
also matter in destination countries. East Asia tends to 
receive more human trafficking inflows, i.e. being in 
East Asia increases the inflows by 3%, while being a 
land-locked country reduces human trafficking by al-
most 10%. While the Muslim culture has a constraining 
effect in origin countries, the Catholicism reduces hu-
man trafficking in destination countries—i.e., an in-
crease in the share of Catholics in population by 10%-
points decreases human trafficking by about 1.2%. Ad-
ditionally, certain types of human flows into coun-
tries—i.e. refugee and tourist inflows—, as well as 
population sizes, increase human trafficking inflows, 
but their magnitudes are rather trivial.  
6. Conclusion  
In this study, I empirically investigated robust push and 
pull factors of human trafficking by exploring a large set 
of variables suggested in the literature. Overall, my find-
ings suggest that the crime pillar most robustly explains 
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human trafficking, among the four pillars discussed 
above. It signals to policy makers that human trafficking 
should not be overlooked just as a side effect of migra-
tion, and urges them to adopt criminal justice and crime 
prevention measures against human trafficking.  
Also, several factors reflecting the other three pil-
lars turn out to have significant effects on human traf-
ficking. The robust impact of income level both in 
origin and destination countries indicates that human 
trafficking is largely a phenomenon related to econom-
ic migration. Institutional quality seems to matter more 
for countries of origin but not necessarily for destina-
tion countries. Vulnerability does not have a straight-
forward relationship with human trafficking. Indeed, a 
high level of gender inequality and underdevelopment 
may even reduce human trafficking, arguably by con-
straining human mobility. Rather than developmental 
indicators, employment structures and demand for 
certain types of labor seem to explain the prevalence 
of human trafficking. Also, the geographic and cultural 
characteristics of countries matter for human traffick-
ing in-/outflows.  
On the other hand, many factors suggested as plau-
sible causes of human trafficking in the literature do 
not turn out to be robust determinants in my analysis. 
However, this does not necessarily lead to the conclu-
sion that such factors do not influence human traffick-
ing at all. While the factors found to be robust in my 
investigation tend to have exclusive explanatory power 
on the prevalence of human trafficking, other factors 
may affect human trafficking via indirect linkage or in-
teracting with some other factors.  
In fact, my study does not claim to provide a final 
conclusion on the determinants of human trafficking 
but rather acknowledges that human trafficking is a 
complex phenomenon in which many factors are inter-
linked. This observation calls for further studies in 
many different aspects, and, in particular, a complex 
relationship between gender discrimination and hu-
man trafficking warrants a closer look.  
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Appendices 
Appendix A. Global datasets on human trafficking. 
Data Measurement Countries covered Years covered Source 
UNODC Incidence of 
Reporting Index 
(origin, transit, and 
destination) 
6 scales: 0 (no reported 
flow)–5 (very high flow) 
161 countries 1996–2003 
(cross-sectional) 
UNODC (2006) 
ILO Global Report 
Data (in-/outflows) 
Number of cases human 
trafficking in-/outflows re-
ported in the ILO global 
dataset 
74 countries 1995–2000 
(cross-sectional) 
Belser et al. (2005) 
US Trafficking in Per-
sons Data 
(origin and destina-
tion) 
Dummy variable: 1 if the 
reported cases are 100 or 
higher in a given year in a 
given country; 0, otherwise 
Max. 190 countries 2000–2010 
(panel) 
United States De-
partment of State 
(2001–2014) 
A.1. Definition of Human Trafficking  
UNODC Incidence of Reporting Index 
“Trafficking in persons shall mean the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring or receipt of persons, by means of 
the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a 
position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having 
control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of 
the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or service, slavery or practices similar to 
slavery, servitude or the removal of organs.” (UN, 2000, article 3)  
ILO Global Report Data 
“Recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons by means of the threat or use of force or other 
forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the 
giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for 
the purpose of exploitation.” (ILO, n.d.) 
US Trafficking in Persons Data 
“Trafficking in persons and human trafficking have been used as umbrella terms for the act of recruiting, harboring, 
transporting, providing, or obtaining a person for compelled labor or commercial sex acts through the use of force, 
fraud, or coercion.” (United States Department of State, 2014) 
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Appendix B. List of push factors examined  
Push Factors Suggested by Effects Data 
GDP pc.  Akee et al. (2010, 2014, 2012), Bettio 
and Nandi (2010), Clawson and Layne 
(2007), Danailova-Trainor and Belser 
(2006), Di Tommaso et al. (2009), Frank 
(2011), Jac-Kucharski (2012), Mo 
(2011), Rao and Presenti (2012) 
negative World Bank (2011) 
Population Clawson and Layne (2007), Danailova-
Trainor and Belser (2006), Frank 
(2011), Mo (2011), Rao and Presenti 
(2012) 
positive World Bank (2011) 
Democracy Frank (2011), Jac-Kucharski (2012) positive/insignificant Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland 
(2010), Marshall, Gurr, & Jaggers 
(2014) 
Control of corruption Bales (2007), Clawson and Layne 
(2007), Jac-Kucharski (2012), Mahmoud 
and Trebesch (2010), Rao and Presenti 
(2012) 
insignificant/negative International Country Risk Guide 
(2009), Kaufmann, Kraay and 
Mastruzzi (2009), Transparency 
International (2010) 
Rule of law Akee et al. (2010, 2014, 2012), 
Mahmoud and Trebesch (2010) 
negative/insignificant International Country Risk Guide 
(2009), Kaufmann et al. (2009) 
Political stability Akee et al. (2014) negative Kaufmann et al. (2009) 
Voice and accountability Akee et al. (2014) insignificant Kaufmann et al. (2009) 
External conflict Akee et al. (2010), Bales (2007), Frank 
(2011), Mo (2011), Rao and Presenti 
(2012) 
negative/insignificant International Country Risk Guide 
(2009) 
Internal conflict Akee et al. (2010), Bales (2007), Frank 
(2011), Mo (2011), Rao and Presenti 
(2012) 
negative/insignificant International Country Risk Guide 
(2009) 
Ethnic tension Clawson and Layne (2007) positive International Country Risk Guide 
(2009) 
Fractionalization: ethnic, 
religious, and language (3 
variables) 
Akee et al. (2010) positive Alesina et al. (2003) 
Refugee and IDP 
populations 
Akee et al. (2010) positive World Bank (2011) 
Transition economy 
(dummy) 
Akee et al. (2014), Rao and Presenti 
(2012) 
positive OECD (2011) 
Landlocked country 
(dummy) 
Akee et al. (2010, 2014, 2012) negative Mayer and Zignago (2011) 
Female unemployment 
rate 
Danailova-Trainor and Belser (2006) positive World Bank (2011) 
Unemployment rate Clawson and Layne (2007), Jac-
Kucharski (2012) 
positive/negative World Bank (2011) 
Labor force participation 
rate 
Clawson and Layne (2007) unclear World Bank (2011) 
Female labor force 
participation rate 
Clawson and Layne (2007) unclear World Bank (2011) 
Share of rural populations Mahmoud and Trebesch (2010) mostly insignificant World Bank (2011) 
Urbanization/capital Mahmoud and Trebesch (2010) insignificant World Bank (2011) 
Infant mortality rate Bales (2007), Mahmoud and Trebesch 
(2010) 
positive/negative World Bank (2011) 
Physicians (per 1,000 
people) 
Mahmoud and Trebesch (2010) insignificant World Bank (2011) 
Crime rate Bettio and Nandi (2010), Clawson and 
Layne (2007), Mahmoud and Trebesch 
(2010) 
insignificant/positive United Nations (2008) 
GINI index Clawson and Layne (2007), Jac-
Kucharski (2012), Mo (2011) 
positive World Bank (2011) 
Poverty measure 
(headcount) 
Clawson and Layne (2007), Mo (2011) positive/negative World Bank (2011) 
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Prostitution law Akee et al. (2010, 2014) mostly insignificant Cho et al. (2013) 
Women’s economic 
rights, social rights (2 
variables) 
Clawson and Layne (2007) negative Cingranelli and Richards (2010) 
Female education: female 
literacy rate (% of female 
age 15 or above) 
Bettio and Nandi (2010), Di Tommaso 
et al. (2009), Rao and Presenti (2012) 
positive/negative/insi
gnificant 
World Bank (2011) 
Female education: female 
literacy rate (% of female 
age 15–24) 
Bettio and Nandi (2010), Di Tommaso 
et al. (2009) 
positive/negative/insi
gnificant 
World Bank (2011) 
Education : literacy rate 
(% of people age 15 or 
above) 
Clawson and Layne (2007), Mahmoud 
and Trebesch (2010), Zhang et al. 
(2011) 
negative/insignificant World Bank (2011) 
Education: literacy rate 
(% of people age 15–24) 
Clawson and Layne (2007), Mahmoud 
and Trebesch (2010), Zhang et al. 
(2011) 
negative/insignificant World Bank (2011) 
TV and phone 
usage/information flows 
Mahmoud and Trebesch (2010), Mo 
(2011) 
negative Dreher (2006) 
Visa restriction Jac-Kucharski (2012) insignificant Neumayer (2006) 
Number of UN 
peacekeepers sent 
abroad, normalized by 
populations 
Smith and Smith (2010) positive Dreher (2006) 
Number of UN 
peacekeepers residing in 
the country, normalized 
by populations 
Smith and Smith (2010) positive Neumayer and Perkins (2008) 
Food production index 
/Share of food, beverage 
and tobacco industries in 
GDP (2 var.) 
Bales (2007) positive World Bank (2011) 
Grant amnesty (Anti-
trafficking protection 
policy) 
Akee et al. (2014) insignificant Cho et al. (2014) 
OECD membership 
(dummy) 
Belser (2005) negative OECD (2011) 
Regional dummy: East 
Asia and Pacific, Europe 
and Central Asia, Latin 
America and Caribbean, 
North Africa and Middle 
East, North America, 
South Asia, and Sub-
Saharan Africa (7 
variables) 
Akee et al. (2014), Rao and Presenti 
(2012) 
positive (the 
reference group: 
developed country-
group) 
World Bank (2011) 
Share of Religion in 
populations: Muslim, 
Catholic, and Protestants 
(3 variables) 
Clawson and Layne (2007) unclear Encyclopedia Britannica (2001) 
Legal origin: British, 
socialist, French, and 
German dummy (4 
variables) 
Akee et al. (2014) insignificant La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
Shleifer, & Vishny (1998) 
Major language: English, 
French, Spanish, 
Portuguese and German 
dummy (5 var.) 
Zhang et al. (2011) Spanish: positive (US 
case study) 
Encyclopedia Britannica (2001) 
Emigration rates Clawson and Layne (2007) positive World Bank (2011) 
Net migrants Clawson and Layne (2007), Mahmoud 
and Trebesch (2010) 
positive World Bank (2011) 
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Fertility rate (number of 
children) 
Di Tommaso et al. (2009) insignificant World Bank (2011) 
Share of age group 0–14 
in total population 
Bales (2007), Mahmoud and Trebesch 
(2010) 
positive World Bank (2011) 
Population density 
(people per square km of 
land area) 
Bales (2007) positive World Bank (2011) 
Consumer price index Clawson and Layne (2007) positive World Bank (2011) 
Amount of heroin seized Clawson and Layne (2007) positive United Nations (2008) 
Human rights index: 
physical integrity 
Clawson and Layne (2007) positive Cingranelli and Richards (2010) 
CO2 Emissions Clawson and Layne (2007) positive World Bank (2011) 
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Appendix C. List of pull factors examined. 
Pull Factors Suggested by Effects Data sources 
GDP pc.  Akee et al. (2010, 2012, 2014), Cho (2013), 
Cho et al. (2013), Frank (2011), Jakobsson 
and Kotsadam (2013) 
positive World Bank (2011) 
Population Cho (2013), Cho et al. (2013), Frank (2011), 
Jakobsson and Kotsadam (2013) 
mostly positive (Frank 
2011, insignificant) 
World Bank (2011) 
Democracy Cho et al. (2013), Frank (2011) negative/positive Cheibub et al. (2010), Marshall et 
al. (2014) 
Control of corruption Bales (2007), Cho (2013) negative International Country Risk Guide 
(2009), Kaufmann et al. (2009), 
Transparency International 
(2010) 
Rule of law Akee et al. (2010, 2012, 2014), Cho et al. 
(2013), Jakobsson and Kotsadam (2013) 
insignificant/negative International Country Risk Guide 
(2009), Kaufmann et al. (2009) 
Political stability Akee et al. (2014) negative Kaufmann et al. (2009) 
Voice and 
accountability 
Akee et al. (2014) insignificant Kaufmann et al. (2009) 
External conflict Akee et al. (2010), Frank (2011) positive International Country Risk Guide 
(2009) 
Internal conflict Akee et al. (2010), Frank (2011) positive International Country Risk Guide 
(2009) 
Ethnic tension Akee et al. (2010) positive International Country Risk Guide 
(2009) 
Fractionalization: 
ethnic, religious, and 
language (3 variables) 
Akee et al. (2010) positive Alesina et al. (2003) 
Leftwing executive Cho et al. (2013) insignificant Beck et al. (2001)  
Rightwing executive Cho et al. (2013) insignificant Beck et al. (2001)  
Media freedom Cho et al. (2013) insignificant Freedom House (2010) 
Prostitution law 
(legalization) 
Akee et al. (2010, 2014), Cho et al. (2013), 
Jakobsson and Kotsadam (2013) 
Insignificant/positive Cho et al. (2013) 
Amount of heroin 
seized 
Jakobsson and Kotsadam (2013) insignificant United Nations (2008) 
Women’s economic 
rights, social rights (2 
variables) 
Cho (2013) insignificant Cingranelli and Richards (2010) 
Social globalization 
(incl. information 
flows) 
Cho (2013) insignificant/mixed Dreher (2006) 
Unemployment rate Cho et al. (2013) insignificant World Bank (2011) 
% of workforce in 
agriculture 
Cho et al. (2013) insignificant World Bank (2011) 
Literacy rate Cho et al. (2013) insignificant World Bank (2011) 
Mortality rate under 
five 
Cho et al. (2013) insignificant World Bank (2011) 
Infant mortality rate Bales (2007) insignificant World Bank (2011) 
Refugees (countries 
of asylum) 
Akee et al. (2010) positive World Bank (2011) 
Share of migrants in 
population 
Jakobsson and Kotsadam (2013) insignificant World Bank (2011) 
Share of age group 65 
or above in total 
populations 
Bales (2007) positive World Bank (2011) 
International tourism 
(number of 
departure) 
Cho et al. (2013) insignificant World Bank (2011) 
Urbanization Cho et al. (2013) insignificant World Bank (2011) 
Visa restriction Cho et al. (2013) insignificant Neumayer (2006) 
Trade (share in GDP) Cho (2013), Danailova-Trainor and Belser 
(2006) 
insignificant/positive World Bank (2011) 
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FDI (share in GDP) Cho (2013) insignificant World Bank (2011) 
Share of food, 
beverage and tobacco 
industries in GDP 
Bales (2007) positive World Bank (2011) 
Energy use Bales (2007) positive World Bank (2011) 
Anti-trafficking Policy Cho et al. (2013) insignificant Cho et al. (2014) 
Grant amnesty 
(protection policy) 
Akee et al. (2014) positive Cho et al. (2014) 
Crime rate Jakobsson and Kotsadam (2013) insignificant United Nations (2008) 
Number of UN 
peacekeepers sent 
abroad, normalized 
by populations 
Cho et al. (2013) insignificant Dreher (2006) 
Number of UN 
peacekeepers 
residing in the 
country, normalized 
by populations 
Cho et al. (2013), Smith and Smith (2010) insignificant/positive Neumayer and Perkins (2008) 
OECD membership 
(dummy) 
Belser (2005), Cho (2013) positive OECD (2011) 
Regional dummy: East 
Asia and Pacific, 
Europe and Central 
Asia, Latin America 
and Caribbean, North 
Africa and Middle 
East, North America, 
South Asia, and Sub-
Saharan Africa (7 
variables) 
Belser (2005), Cho et al. (2013) negative/insignificant 
(reference group: 
developed country- 
group) 
World Bank (2011) 
Share of Religion in 
populations: Muslim, 
Catholic, and 
Protestants (3 
variables) 
Cho et al. (2013) partly negative 
(Catholic) 
Encyclopedia Britannica (2001) 
Legal origin: British, 
socialist, French, and 
German dummy (4 
variables) 
Akee et al. (2014), Cho et al. (2013) mostly insignificant La Porta et al. (1998) 
Major language: 
English, French, 
Spanish, Portuguese, 
and German dummy 
(5 variables) 
Cho et al. (2013) insignificant Encyclopedia Britannica (2001) 
Transition economy 
(dummy) 
Akee et al. (2014) negative OECD (2011) 
Landlocked country 
(dummy) 
Akee et al. (2010, 2012, 2014) negative Mayer and Zignago (2011) 
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Appendix D. Human trafficking flows. 
1. Inflows: Destination country list (source: UNODC, 2006). 
Very High High Medium Low Very Low 
Belgium 
Germany 
Greece 
Israel 
Italy 
Japan 
Netherlands 
Thailand 
Turkey 
United States of 
America 
 
Australia 
Austria 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
Cambodia 
Canada 
China 
Hong Kong, China 
SAR 
Taiwan Province of 
China 
Cyprus 
Czech Republic 
Denmark 
France 
India 
Kosovo, 
(Serbia and 
Montenegro) 
Pakistan 
Poland 
Saudi Arabia 
Spain 
Switzerland 
United Arab 
Emirates 
United Kingdom 
 
Albania 
Argentina 
Bahrain 
Benin 
Bulgaria 
Burkina Faso 
Cameroon 
Cote d'Ivoire 
Croatia 
Curacao 
Dominican Republic 
El Salvador 
Equatorial Guinea 
Estonia 
Finland 
Gabon 
Ghana 
Guatemala 
Hungary 
Iceland 
Iran 
Kazakhstan 
Kenya 
Kuwait 
Latvia 
Lebanon 
Lithuania 
Macao, China SAR 
Malaysia 
Mexico 
Myanmar 
New Zealand 
Nigeria 
Norway 
Panama 
Philippines 
Portugal 
Qatar 
Republic of Korea 
Russian Federation 
Serbia and 
Montenegro 
Singapore 
South Africa 
Sweden 
Syrian Arab 
Republic 
The former Yugoslav 
Macedonia 
Togo 
Ukraine 
Venezuela 
Vietnam 
Aruba 
Bangladesh 
Belize 
Brunei Darussalam 
Congo, Republic of 
Costa Rica 
Ecuador 
Egypt 
Haiti 
Indonesia 
Iraq 
Ireland 
Kyrgyzstan 
Lao People's 
Democratic 
Republic 
Libyan Arab 
Jamahiriya 
Luxembourg 
Mali 
Niger 
Oman 
Paraguay 
Romania 
Slovenia 
Sri Lanka 
Uganda 
United Republic of 
Tanzania 
Uzbekistan 
Yemen 
Algeria 
Bhutan 
Brazil 
Burundi 
Chad 
Chile 
Congo, Democratic 
Republic of 
Djibouti 
Dominica 
Ethiopia 
Fiji 
Gambia 
Georgia 
Honduras 
Jamaica 
Liberia 
Malawi 
Maldives 
Morocco 
Mozambique 
Republic of 
Moldova 
Senegal 
Sierra Leone 
Slovakia 
Sudan 
Tajikistan 
Trinidad and 
Tobago 
Zambia 
Zimbabwe 
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2.  Outflows: Origin country list (source: UNODC, 2006). 
Very High High Medium Low Very Low 
Albania Armenia Afghanistan Argentina Brunei  
Belarus Bangladesh Algeria Bhutan Chad 
Bulgaria Benin Angola Botswana Chile 
China Brazil Azerbaijan Burundi Costa Rica 
Lithuania Cambodia Bosnia Canada Egypt 
Nigeria Colombia Burkina Faso Cape Verde Fiji 
Moldova Czech Republic Cameroon Congo,  DR Jamaica 
Romania Dominican  Congo Djibouti Macao 
Russia Estonia Cote d`Ivoire Eq. Guinea Netherlands 
Thailand Georgia Croatia Eritrea Paraguay 
Ukraine Ghana Cuba Gabon Syria 
 Guatemala North Korea Gambia Uruguay 
 Hungary Ecuador Guinea Yemen 
 India El Salvador Iran   
 Kazakhstan Ethiopia Iraq  
 Lao  Haiti Jordan  
 Latvia Honduras Lebanon  
 Mexico Hong Kong Lesotho  
 Morocco Indonesia Madagascar  
 Myanmar Kenya Maldives  
 Nepal Kosovo  Nicaragua  
 Pakistan Kyrgyzstan Panama  
 Philippines Liberia Rwanda  
 Poland Malawi South Korea  
 Slovakia Malaysia Somalia  
 Uzbekistan Mali Sudan  
 Vietnam Mozambique Swaziland  
  Niger Tunisia  
  Peru  USA  
  Senegal  Zimbabwe  
  Serbia and Montenegro    
  Sierra Leone    
  Singapore   
  Slovenia   
  South Africa   
  Sri Lanka   
  Macedonia   
  Taiwan    
  Tajikistan   
  Togo   
  Turkey   
  Turkmenistan   
  Uganda   
  Tanzania   
  Venezuela    
  Zambia   
Note: Countries with no (reported) in-/outflows are not listed here. 
 
